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The current federalism paradigm has been on a path to failure since its inception.  The various 
methods of federalism from the past have attempted to effectively fuse both federal and state 
power based on the most pervasive interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.  While some eras 
have experienced a rise in national power and others experienced rising state power, no era of 
federalism has seen such pervasive and individualized pursuits of policy control than the current 
opportunistic era, where both national and state policy power are given equal, and thus divisive 
and corrosive, implementation.  This disruptive form of intergovernmental relations gained steam 
during George W. Bush's presidency and has continued into the Obama administration.  Change 
is necessary if federalism is to move forward in a positive direction.  Effective policy 
prescription needs cooperation, coordination, effici nt flows of information, and 
stakeholder/public input.  Since the opportunistic method does not provide these quality control 
elements a form of controlled devolution is necessary.  This would involve more state-led 
initiatives, less federal mandates and preemptions, plus a national intergovernmental board to 
oversee federalism affairs (much like the now defunct U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations).   
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“Each state, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent 
 of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.  In this relation, then, the 
 new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution 
 (Madison, 1788 No. 39).” 
 
The above quote, from one of the many Federalist Papers writings, describes the 
reasoning behind the incorporation of a federal governmental system into the Constitution.  The 
founding fathers, fearing tyrannical rule from a strong and centralized government, made sure 
that the new country they were creating would be able to stop power from becoming 
encapsulated in one central arm of their new governm ntal body.  Instead, they felt that 
individual states/localities/regions should be able to defend their citizens from centralized rule by 
specifically giving the national and state governmets separate powers that could not be 
circumvented.  The Constitutional framers were afraid of a political redistribution of wealth, 
sometimes referred to as the tyranny of the majority, so the barriers of federalism were put into 
place to act as a check on the will of the majority.  The current model of federalism has been 
systematically destroying the foundational relationships between the levels of government.  
Opportunistic federalism has run its course, causing confusion and chaos from local to federal 
levels.  It is time for a new system to be put into place to fix the damage done to 
intergovernmental relations since the end of Clinton's presidency.  Alternative models are 
analyzed in an attempt to institute a new intergovernmental system that allows for better agency 
communication and control of policy implementation.  The focus is on more state-led 
initiatives/autonomy and less federal preemption and mandates.   
The concept of federalism, broadly defined as the division of power between national and 
regional governments, has been woven in and out of the American political system since the 
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founding fathers first argued over the best way to govern.  Unlike unitary and confederal systems 
of government, a federal system divides and occasion lly shares power between the various 
levels of government.  This divide facilitates certain benefits that the other two systems cannot 
produce: a cooperative separation of powers, governm nt is kept closer to the people (where the 
US government supposedly derives its power), it accommodates local and state/regional 
differences through a mutual compatibility of shared values, it permits experimentation and 
teamwork, it can work to preserve national unity and it can provide the states economic benefits 
from a larger market; and all of these help to achieve national goals because the national 
government can protect its states from external pressur s. 
 Federalism, like any governmental framework, does have its disadvantages.  The lack of 
a strong, centralized authority moving policy in one uninterrupted direction can make things 
more complex for business.  Obviously a federal system can breed conflict over, and for, the 
distribution of power; something that has been happening since the US government formed.  The 
divided government, separation of powers and local autonomy in the policy making process have 
the chance to promote duplication which could reduc efficiency and accountability, two things 
necessary for successful policy implementation.  Coordination, cooperation and control, three 
vital aspects of a federal system, can become quite difficult with power disbursed so diversely 
through so many states/regions and across a land mass as large as the US.  Last, but certainly not 
least, the autonomy given to states and localities can, and has, produced inequalities to such a 
large extent that the national government must step in to fix them. 
For the past couple centuries, federalism has been incorporated differently by every 
successive president/administration in some form or another.  Beginning with dual federalism 
after the Bank Controversy of 1819, and its contrasting theories of middle ground and layer cake 
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federalism, through cooperative and new federalism, the entire idea of constitutional versus 
political power has been interpreted differently.  It wasn’t until the past few decades that a new 
concept of federalism, opportunistic, began to emerge.  Specifically, the idea reared its ugly head 
during George W. Bush’s first term of office in 2000.  Federalism began to exhibit signs of 
distress: a lack of consistency in policy direction, little cooperation between governmental levels, 
and a paucity of cohesion.    
 Federal, state, and local governments, who at one tim  were working together through 
various means, began to start working against each other and for themselves.  Conlan gives the 
best definition of opportunistic federalism: a system that allows and encourages actors to pursue 
their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective consequences 
(Conlan 2006, 667).  Bush federalism was the beginning of the end for modern, working 
intergovernmental relations.  His administration formed policies that discouraged cooperation 
between the layers of government throughout the United States.  At the same time, it 
implemented policies that would try to strengthen states’ rights and enhance the powers of the 
national government.  This is an extremely difficult, if not impossible task.  Again, the previous 
Clinton administration began this practice, but notat the levels that the Bush administration 
proliferated.  This opportunistic approach created a monster out of public policy, one that can 
best be described as Plato's Ouroboros (see Figure 1). 
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               Figure 1: Plato's Ouroboros 
 This ouroborosian policy is continually attempting to eat itself like the previous 
illustration demonstrates.  Policies that try to strengthen both the state and federal governments 
at the same time eventually fail.  Once the snake eting itself gets to the end there is no place else 
to go.  Essentially, the government is creating a power struggle between the areas of control 
given to the national and state governments.  This power struggle comes at the confusing cost of 
trying to decipher what level of government is really in control.   
 Allowing states to take more control over their more immediate spheres of influence by 
legalizing medical and recreational marijuana usage, sodomy laws, welfare policy, and 
discretionary use of grant money may seem like an intergovernmental policy that would work.  
These policies are currently in place.  Unfortunately hese allotments of state power come at a 
cost of vastly increased scope of national government's power through policies like No Child 
Left Behind, the PATRIOT Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (an unfunded mandate) and 
the federal income tax cuts given to the wealthy.  These policies can create spillover, a term that 
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comes from the correspondence principle which state, “If you use it, you determine it.”  When 
done incorrectly, pieces of policy, like some from the aforementioned NCLB, can spill over from 
one level to another which drastically affects the coordination between the levels of government, 
and coordination is key for proper policy implementation.    
Up until opportunistic federalism emerged, most political administrations used federalism 
in certain, specific ways.  Most often one arm of the government would be strengthened while 
another was weakened.  In other words federalism was normally used to facilitate the power 
struggle between the federal government and state gov rnment.  Many presidents would decide 
which way they wanted their specific administration t  focus on federalism, or which arm of the 
government they wanted to strengthen.  Normally the president would then follow that direction 
for the rest of his term of office even if policies were unpopular, because they do like consistency 
in the executive branch.  The opportunistic approach does not bring about consistency.  Instead it 
breeds confusion, contempt, and selfishness (in an administrative capacity).   
Opportunistic federalism goes against all other forms of federalism in such a haphazard 
way that, as George W. Bush’s administration and now the Obama administration have shown, it 
is harmful and confusing.  Past forms of federalism have held institutional and collective 
consequences in high regard.  This only makes sense.  If an administration wants to enact a 
policy that is supposed to strengthen the federal government, then that policy better benefit, not 
harm, the federal institution.  Opportunistic federalism throws this concept out and pursues the 
immediate interests of whoever is using it as their framework for policy changes.  Instead of 
focusing on shared goals within the government, indiv dual, political and jurisdictional interests 
are put above all others.  The importance of one branch is put above all others, even though this 
same branch might be deemed unimportant within the very next policy!  Consistency is nowhere 
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to be found.  It is this practice that led to too much of the Bush administration’s muddled policy 
initiatives and the ongoing power grab during the Obama administration.   
What the United States needs is a new form of controlled devolution where state-led 
innovations in the public policy arena are coordinated and controlled financially by a federal 
intergovernmental board like the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations used to.  
This form of federalism could alleviate many of the problems the opportunistic model has 
caused.  An analysis of the previous federalism paradigms will show how federalism has 
evolved, and recently begun to devolve.  Such analysis will help create a unified structure to 
build a new form of federalism based on using various aspects of previous forms and new 
models focused on cooperation.  Adlai Stevenson said, “In a democracy, people usually get the 
kind of government they deserve.”  The American peopl  deserve better than what the 















Before the ratification of the Constitution there really wasn't a true form of federalism.  
The mess that the Articles of Confederation made showed the founders and framers that some 
sort of organization was going to be necessary to properly govern this new country.  The “uneasy 
federalism” that existed from the time of ratification until 1819 came directly from the overriding 
fear of tyranny, a monarchy, and strong executive power, which were the largest reasons the 
revolution had been fought.  This era of federalism focused on the undefined areas of control 
created by the Articles of Confederation and the power struggle spurred by the fear of a new 
tyrant.   
Ratification gave birth to federalism through the various clauses and amendments written 
into the Constitution: expressly delegated powers (those specifically written), implied powers 
(suggested, but not written), reserved powers (based on an interpretation of the 10th Amendment) 
and the national supremacy clause (found in Article 6 and states that federal law overrides state 
law). The time period between ratification, a process that lasted from September 1787 until May 
1790, and the McCulloch v Maryland Supreme Court decision in 1819 can be seen as 30 years of 
the newly formed government coming to grasps with its new powers and trying to enact some 
working form of cooperation between the states and the federal government.  The Marshall 
Court's decision in that court case changed the nature of the relationship among the three 
branches of government.  Finally, the judicial branch was attempting to take power away from its 
rivals in the other two branches. 
The essence of the McCulloch v Maryland case was a state attempting to tax a national 
bank, thereby taxing the federal government.  In the state's view, there was nothing prohibiting 
that form of taxation in the Constitution.  The Supreme Court did not agree and in its decision 
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established the first real form of federalism in the U.S.  It was a monumental decision that laid 
the groundwork for future governmental interaction (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013).  The Court's 
use of the necessary and proper clause and assertion of mplied powers strengthened the power 
of the national government over that of the states.  This supreme federalism lasted for about 20 
years until it was overtaken in about 1837 by the first truly giant federalism paradigm known as 
dual federalism. 
The Marshall Court's decision established a few important federalist tenents that have 
laid the groundwork for intergovernmental disputes ever since.  First, the Constitution derives its 
sovereignty from the people, so therefore the natiol government derives its power from the 
people as well.  Second, the Necessary and Proper Clause means more than a strict lingual 
definition of the word necessary.  It is too difficult to perform all of the enumerated powers that 
way, making the clause quite vague.  This made the clause a useful tool for the government to 
give itself more power.  Third, the Supremacy Clause clearly defined the Court's decision that the 
state could not interfere in the national government's functioning, so the state  could not tax the 
national bank; making federal/national laws superior to the laws of the states and their localities. 
 These tenents immediately began to have a strong impact on the relationship between the 
states and the national government.  Their relationship had been altered forever by the third 
branch created to do exactly that: work as a check and balance on the executive and legislative 
branches.  By affecting the interaction between those governmental entities, the Supreme Court 
guaranteed there would be future conflict among the thr e about who has the power to do what, 
when where, why and how.  This supreme era lasted a relatively short time because of the 
conflict it created; while making some parts of theConstitution more vague and others more 
exact and enumerated, the Court ensured arguments.  The conflict created by the supreme era 
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would begin to pave the way for the eventual opportunistic model where conflict was a frequent 
occurrence among the varying levels of government.  The Bush v Gore decision can be seen as a 
modern opportunistic example of when the Supreme Court decides to get involved in 
intergovernmental affairs. 
 For these reasons dual federalism can be seen as a retali tory blow from those in the 
government who did not agree with the power rules established by the Court.  For 100 years, 
from the mid 1830's until the 1930's, the dual era r igned supreme and one of the major themes 
of this federalist period is the national/federal government expanding its power.  A popular term 
to label this era, and the first real model of federalism, is Layer Cake federalism.   
 Figure 2: Dual Federalism 
As Figure 2 shows, this form of federalism can best be seen as a clear separation of the powers 
between the varying levels of government.  The different layers of the US governmental system 
have distinct areas of law that they cannot share with the other “layers.”  This model of separated 
powers clearly delineates constitutional powers, both enumerated and implied, in a way that 
echoes the views of Tenth Amendment supporters: no sharing (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013).  
The separate spheres of authority created in this model narrowly interpret the 10th Amendment 
when it comes to federal powers, but broadly interpret it in favor of state power.   
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 One of the chief architects of the dual era was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Roger 
Taney (famous for his Dred Scott v Sandford ecision).  Taney was a “strict constructionist” who 
believed the Constitution must be interpreted by the letter of the law.  Enumeration was key to 
Taney because if a power is not specifically mentioned/written in the Constitution then Taney 
and other strict constructionists believed that power belongs to the states.  He, and many others, 
believed that there should be no shared powers between the federal and state governments 
(which would look a lot like Figure 2 above).  Taney and other constructionists interpreted the 
Tenth Amendment's reserved powers clause in a way that saw sharing powers as 
unconstitutional.  Naturally, during this era the powers of the state and national governments 
began to take on the scope seen today as many legal/constitutional delineations were being 
created and enforced.  What the strict constructionists, who are still around today, fail to realize 
is that as society inevitably changes government must adjust with it.  If the government refuses 
this then stagnation and societal unrest will follow.  The federalism paradigm offered by the dual 
model is not sensitive to movement between the layers.  Thus, making changes to 
intergovernmental relations under this model becomes difficult, time consuming, impractical, 
and costly; four things that policies do not need as obstacles to implementation. 
 Several federalism issues were raised and resolved during this era and their ramifications 
are still being felt.  One of the biggest ways the national government was able to expand its 
power during the dual era was the Interstate Commerce Act, which was aimed at regulating 
businesses whose commercial operations were spread over multiple states.  A state-centered 
federalist would have no problems with businesses doing this as long as the individual states 
were able to handle the monetary responsibilities.  The federal government believed the opposite 
and with the passage of the act began to regulate commercial interactions involving multiple 
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states.  This meant that the national government could start regulating private businesses.  Before 
this businesses were giving most of their taxes to the states through wage taxes and labor laws.  
The Morrill Acts, and the land grant system that came with them, were an easy way for the 
national government to take control of large tracts of land that the states could have been in 
control of instead (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 The arguments over state-centered and nation-centered interpretations of the Tenth 
Amendment experienced during the dual era have not gone away and are still a large part of 
federalism disputes.  The dual era paved the way for the opportunistic model's agency/policy-
centered pursuits on interests instead of focusing on the collective governmental good.  As long 
as a policy approach follows certain constitutional and legal frameworks then its implementation 
is inevitable under the opportunistic model.  The fact that policies will strengthen both federal 
and state power simultaneously is not an issue according to opportunistic federalists as long as 
these individual policies follow dual era constitutional interpretations.  These competing 
interests, while federally valid, eventually clash with each other leading to intergovernmental 
disputes and jurisdictional grievances.    
 Like many aspects of American life, the Great Depression had a profound impact on 
federalism's mechanisms.  In the 1930's, after FDR took office, a new form of federalism was 
imposed by the new presidential administration.  If the previous form could be seen as a layer 
cake of non-connected powers, the new cooperative fed ralism could be seen as a marble cake of 
inter-connected powers shared between the varying layers of government.  Suddenly the national 
government was willing to devolve a little more power to the state and local governments and act 
in a parental fashion.  After WWII the United States had made it out of the Great Depression and 
the national government had a surplus.  Roosevelt's “New Deal” had helped out the struggling 
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state and local governments by creating many work projects, and other government funded 
projects to help stimulate job growth.  After the war the states were still struggling monetarily 
due to lost revenue from income taxes and property taxes not collected due to the dire economic 
effects of the Great Depression.  From the mid-1930's until 1961 the cooperative model helped 
bridge the gap between the national and state governments created by the previous dual model. 
 The main way that the national government was ableto share policy power with the 
states was through federal subsidy programs and grant-in-aid programs (which would become a 
preeminent force in federalism power struggles from then until now).  With the creation of the 
interstate highway system under Eisenhower, transportati n funding became a driving force for 
state governmental interaction with the various federal entities involved in transportation.  While 
the states were given more power to decide how to use some of the federal grant money they 
were receiving, the federal government was able to force states, when it was deemed necessary 
to cooperate with national plans by using federal funds.  The best examples of this type of 
coercement was when the federal government forced states to standardize the minimum drinking 
age, speed limits, and seat belt laws by threatening to withhold transportation funding which 
states rely heavily upon to maintain their transportation infrastructures. 
 This was a tumultuous time in federalism's existence; societal growth and the natural 
progression of government necessitated a form of intergovernmental relations that could be 
flexible to the rising and falling tides modernization threw at it: 
 A general pattern of power distribution by policy fields evolved, centralizing trade and 
 commerce at the national level while leaving culture, education and social policy at the 
 sub-national level. Soon this became a problem for m dernizing and democratizing 
 societies. Federal trade and commerce policies created or reinforced patterns of uneven 
 regional development. Overburdened with social policy problems, regional governments 
 became dependent on federal transfers. Fiscal revenu  was increasingly spent by 
 governments which did not have the capacity to raise it. Fiscal distribution and transfer 
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 schemes became the main preoccupation of federal systems. The original separation of 
 powers became blurred, by political interlocking...by the wild growth of a mostly 
 conditional federal grants system (Hueglin 2003, 287). 
 
The cooperative model attempted to address the regional disparities and interlocking policy 
decisions that had historically been made by one lev l of government that were now being made 
by both because of the fiscal problems state and localities were facing.  While the dual model 
had done its job allocating tasks to certain levels of government based on the current 
interpretation of the Constitution, growth and modernization had hit the United States hard from 
the late 19th to the mid-20th century.  Regional disparities are going to happen b cause not every 
state and locality have the ability to generate the same amount of revenue.  Unfortunately for the 
resident of some states, federal mandates hit hard during the coercive era. 
 The cooperative era embodied the good things that can happen when intergovernmental 
relations are approached in a way that focuses on co rdination between the levels of government, 
something that the opportunistic model lacks.  The modern erosion of this cooperation began 
with the coercive era, but it was the eventual overstepping of the federal government in its 
attempts to grab power during the cooperative era that led to the coercive era.  This federal 
power grab served as a great modern model to follow during the opportunistic era.  The forms of 
federal power extension experienced during the opportunistic era (the PATRIOT Act, Homeland 
Security, etc.) have flowed from the examples set during the cooperative era.  
 At the height of the cooperative model a new era in federalism began and the Civil Rights 
Movement was at the heart of the new coercive federalism.  This paradigm was concerned with 
how the states, many of them southern, were handling race relations.  The national government 
realized that if left to their own devices, many states would seemingly try their hardest to 
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continue segregationist practices.  This was an effort to systematically step around provisions 
from the three Civil War Amendments to the Constitution (the 13th, 14th and 15th) and the various 
legal decisions since the end of the Civil War (primarily the Brown v Board of Education ruling).  
Something had to be done to force the states to comply with federal law.  Fortunately the federal 
government had most of the money at this time. 
 This fiscal mismatch was the way the federal government used a “Carrot and Stick” 
approach during the coercive era.  This new paradigm began in 1961 and the grants-in-aid 
programs the government had previously been using were the carrots offered to the states for 
desegregation compliance.  Block grants, which have vague spending requirements, were not 
used as much as categorical grants, whose spending requirements are much more specific.  JFK 
and LBJ dangled categorical grants to the states with the hope that the states' need for federal 
funds would outweigh their determination to not integrate.  LBJ's Great Society was focused on 
fixing many of the societal ills that had rarely been addressed in the past: primarily racial 
tensions and the War on Poverty.  When the states would not cooperate with the desires of the 
federal government's policy initiatives, the court system was used as the stick to punish the 
states. 
 The minimum standards set by LBJ's Great Society initiative required actions some of the 
states refused to take and the federal government began to attack states' illegal election practices 
through court action.  The two court cases with the largest impact on the states were Baker v 
Carr and Westbury v Sanders.  In the Baker decision, the one person, one vote principle was 
established and voting districts were required to be of equal size.  Today this might sound 
redundant because of course districts are the same ize. Why would the courts need to legislate 
that?  Isn't that in the Constitution?  This ruling created a shock wave through many states 
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because it impacted rural districts.  The Westbury decision attacked the historic practice of 
apportioning certain voting districts in a way that would disproportionally affect one political 
party's electoral representation, a practice termed g rrymandering.  This court decision made 
districts of unequal size illegal and primarily focused on the urban districts that had been created 
to disenfranchise the minority vote.  If certain states refused to change their segregationist 
practices, then the national government would come down on them with new electoral hammers 
to drive home the death nails of these illegal practices.   
 Coercive federalism lasted as long as LBJ was in the White House.  After the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 states began to finally bend to the desegregation 
will of the federal government.  This form of federalism, while only lasting about seven years, 
had a profound impact on not only the federalist relations between the various governmental 
spheres, but also on American society as a whole.  The Civil Rights Era is a black eye on the 
Statue of Liberty, one that will hopefully one day be healed, and is also an era that few people 
want the United States returning to.  The mandates nd preemptions used by the national 
government during this era are a great preview of some of the interactions between the national 
and state governments during the opportunistic era.  The carrot and stick mentality of forcing 
states to enact federal policies they don't agree with did not leave with the coercive era.  They 
stayed and have been used ever since when the federal government needs to force policy change 
through uncooperative state governments, sometimes to the detriment of local governments and 
citizens.  
 When Nixon took office in 1968 he brought the next intergovernmental paradigm: new 
federalism.  This paradigm was unique to Nixon's terms in the White House and was his 
administration's way of exerting federal power over the states and his Democratic rivals.  
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General Revenue Sharing began to be used as the new form of grant-in-aid programs.  Nixon 
liked to give Democratic states/districts/politicians categorical grants so the federal government 
could put in specific spending requirements that the Democrats had no control over.  Basically he 
said here is the money, it must be used the way I want and others have no say in the matter!  
While this was a bastardization of the concept of federalism, it did work for a while.  The Nixon 
administration used these grants as a carrot and then impounded appropriated funds and refused 
to release them to the intended states/agencies as a tick.   
 Unfortunately for Nixon, Congress made his impoundment method illegal in 1974 with 
the Budget Impoundment and Control Act.  General Revenue Sharing wasn't working, and was 
not the equalizer that many thought it would be because the numbers were so easily manipulated.  
Though it still exists in some forms on the state and international levels, it is no longer used on 
the national level (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013).   
 The coercive and new federalism eras experienced certain events that shaped the 
federalism trends seen during the period from about 1960-1980.  The Civil Rights era, General 
Revenue Sharing, the War on Poverty and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid were all 
byproducts and architects of the overriding trends.  These two periods saw a massive increase in 
the flow of federal dollars (causing an increasing local governmental dependence on federal and 
state aid), a public dissatisfaction with government (because of the Watergate scandal during 
Nixon's second term and Vietnam War), increased suburbanization (creating a need for more 
coordination between the various government levels), and the emergence of a regional 
competition for growth and money between the frostbelt and the sunbelt (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 
2013).   
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 After fifty years of federalism paradigms attempting to expand national power at the 
expense of state autonomy, Ronald Reagan took office in 1980 and brought in the next era: the 
rather unimaginatively named new, new federalism.  Reagan's model of federalism can be seen 
as a pseudo return to the strict constructionist era of the Dual model.  Reagan, and many others, 
felt like the past 50 years had seen the national government stripping away the Constitutional 
rights of the states.  The new constructionists had an interpretive view of the Tenth Amendment 
that echoed those of Taney.  So Reagan's chant was “Cut, cut, cut” and the way his 
administration attempted to strip the national government of the power it felt had been wrongly 
taken from the states was through Reagan's 3 D's: devolution, decentralization, and deregulation. 
 The 1980's saw a major shift in a large portion of the US population's views about how 
the government should function.  The New Deal and the Great Society had made believers out of 
many about how well the national government could work, as long as the states were along for 
the ride.  The malaise and distrust created by the Nixon administration, and the shifting economy 
under the Carter administration, can be seen as the prime catalysts for Reagan's new federalism 
model.  The federal government could no longer be trusted.  Now was the time for the states to 
take back their power (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013).   
 In 1985 Reagan's second term saw a landmark federalism court case, Garcia v. San 
Antonio, where federalism suddenly became a political question.  The court overruled a previous 
decision made in the National League of Cities case of 1976 where the Tenth Amendment was 
reborn.  In National League of Cities federalism became a Constitutional question because the 
pay for city/state employees became protected from intrusion.  The Garcia decision attacked the 
federal minimum wage law originally protected by the Darby decision in 1941 and then upheld 
by Cities.  The different federalism paradigms have approached int rgovernmental relations with 
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either a political or Constitutional framework.  What that means is when the people can go 
straight to the Supreme Court to enact policy change federalism has become a Constitutional 
issue because Congress is bypassed in favor of the Courts.  Federalism becomes political when 
the classic flow of ideas from people>states>governm t is followed and the Courts are 
generally left out of the equation. 
 Reagan's main method of decentralization was to use privatization, or outsourcing, to 
shift control of policy implementation away from the national government and into the hands of 
private businesses.  Once these businesses have control, the states in which they are based have a 
larger input into the implementation of the various policy areas that have been privatized.  This 
happened on all three levels of government and its effects are still being seen today.  
Deregulation was another way Reagan's administration w uld use this new, new model to strip 
federal agencies of their power.  This was the most successful of the administration's three D's, 
and it stripped federal agencies of the ability to exert their influence on policy implementation by 
giving private companies and governmental agencies more control over their tasks.  Again, this 
was a way to increase state and local influence on areas in their control by using a state's rights 
interpretation of the 10th Amendment.  The telecommunications, airlines and foo  industries were 
significantly affected by this policy preference.   
 The last of the D's, devolution, can be seen as the overarching view Reagan had on 
government: the national government should cede policy power to the states.  Two of the largest 
ways the administration attempted to do this were by decreasing the number of block grant 
categories from seventy-seven down to nine and by instituting the “Big Swap.”  The swap would 
have become a massive failure in Reagan's legacy had Congress not voted against it.  The 
concept behind the policy initiative was that the federal government would take control of 
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Medicaid and the state governments would take control of welfare, primarily in the form of food 
stamps.  Reagan's federalism paradigm saw this action as one that would take a large future 
financial burden off of the states' hands and impose it on the federal government.  The states 
would then inherit the smaller future financial burden of welfare programs.  Under the new, new 
model state and local governments would have suffered more than the federal government; the 
exact opposite of what the Reagan administration intended.  Local governments would have been 
effected the most, funding-wise, because they would en  up receiving little to no federal 
assistance to pay for the various new policy implementations.  State governments would be 
adversely effected as well, leading them to have to increase taxes to pay for the new initiatives.  
The failure of Reagan's new, new federalism paradigm is still being felt today throughout the 
economies and budgets of local, state, and national governmental agencies.  This failure is also 
what led to the new federalism model initiated by the Clinton administration: a return to more 
cooperative federalism. 
 Since Reagan's terms, new forms of federal control have been used in an attempt to 
ameliorate funding issues that federal mandates have created.  Direct orders, while rare, are 
occasionally used when the federal government has no other avenue to get certain policies 
enacted at the state and local level.  These orders come with the full weight and force of national 
power and states/localities must abide by them or else serious measures can be taken; the Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1982 being a good example of a more recent direct order.  Cross-cutting 
requirements, conditions on federal grants that are ext nded to all programs regardless of the 
source, have been used nationally to try to extend some sort of program fairness that might 
otherwise not exist.  Title IX in athletics programs and student loans are good examples of these 
requirements.  Cross-over sanctions involve giving a d taking federal grant money away from 
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certain policy elements if the lower governmental levels aren't acting correctly (Lee, Johnson and 
Joyce 2013).   
 Preemption is maybe the most controversial, for strict constructionists anyway, of these 
new control mechanisms.  Preemption can be seen as the embodiment, in a way, of the 
Supremacy Clause.  The two primary issues involved in preemption are states' rights and saving 
states money.  These can be addressed by one of the thre  preemptive measures: partial, 
mandatory partial and entire.  Partial preemption is used when a state doesn't, or cannot, run an 
aspect of the policy program, whether it be because of a refusal to cooperate or a lack of funds.  
In this case the federal government steps in and rus that aspect of the program.  Mandatory 
partial preemption is when implementation is imposed on states like in an unfunded mandate; the 
Clean Air Act of 1990 being a good example of this preemptive style.  When these policies are 
not implemented the national government will come down on the states with “Hammer 
Provisions,” something states do not want to encounter.  Entire preemption, like the name 
suggests, is when the supremacy or commerce clause is imposed and the entire functions of the 
policy are federally taken over (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 Various presidential administrations, and their differing federalism models, approach 
these preemptions differently.  One area where this can be seen is the last mechanism of federal 
control: matching state and local funds by the national government.  Matching funds are an 
important way in which the federal and state/local governments work together to actively 
implement good policy.  Most of these projects require the state to maintain the infrastructure 
funded primarily by the national government.  Highway funding, for example, is normally 10% 
state funded and 90% federally funded.  In essence, the federal government puts up the bulk of 
the money needed for the program and then the state i  tasked with maintaining it into the future.  
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This not only guards against fungibility concerns, but also ensures that pre-grant levels are 
maintained.  This makes sure that the states don't receive too much money to help avoid wasteful 
spending, an action that is never popular with voters (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013).  
 Many of the problems with the opportunistic model b gan under Reagan's presidency 
with his administration's ill-fated attempts at strengthening state power at the expense of federal 
power.  Though the disastrous effects weren't immediat ly clear during Reagan's tenure, they 
began to become abundantly clear near the end of Clinton's presidency when the opportunistic 
model began to emerge.  New, new federalism was a catalyst for the competing policy battles 
brought to fruition under the opportunistic model because of the negative effects and 
implications many of Reagan's policy goals had on intergovernmental relations.   
 Clinton's new take on the cooperative model focused on exactly what the term implies: 
clear intergovernmental cooperation.  One of the ways in which the new administration 
approached this task was to take the unfunded mandate off the table.  These mandates had been 
used in the past by the federal government to coerce the states into following national policy 
preferences over their own in the form of various types of grants.  A famous example of an 
unfunded mandate is when the Americans with Disabilities Act forced every locality in America 
to alter its infrastructure to accompany those with d sabilities without any funding help from the 
federal government (a mandate that put a severe strain on many local government's budgets who 
were unable to make the changes) (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 One of the best things for federalism to come out of the Clinton Administration was the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.  These types of mandates have been detrimental to 
state and local governments because of the revenue flow and budgetary limits of these 
governments.  This reform was a big step in the right direction towards a more cooperative 
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intergovernmental model because these mandates were now limited by their overall cost figure.  
Along with cost limitations, placing new conditions on current grant programs was prohibited.  
Before the national government could initiate one of these mandates, analysis and estimation of 
the overall cost to the state/locality became required to make sure that the mandate wouldn't be 
economically harmful to the lower governments (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 The Clinton administration was also able to accomplish two tasks that seem like they 
would cancel each other out: the size of the governm nt was reduced and the national 
government was given more power over the states.  Reducing the size of the government doesn't 
sound like the policy goal of a Democratic president.  Neither does increasing the size of the 
national government like George W. Bush did after Clinton, a goal that few Republicans desire.  
The National Performance Review that was tasked to Vice President Al Gore completely altered 
the way bureaucracy functioned on the national level and also altered the nature of 
intergovernmental relationships.  By streamlining processes and agencies in a way to better 
facilitate the movement of information and protocols, the NPR fixed some of the muddled 
communication that had been in place since Reagan was in office.  
 The devolution prescription Reagan's federalism sought to apply to the U.S. continued its 
march through Clinton's Presidency.  1996 saw the implementation of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.  An embodiment of state-centered 
devolutionist intergovernmental policy, this Act gave states more control over the use of the 
TANF block grants given to them by the federal government: “The discretion of states extended 
to the determination of eligibility, the design of methods of assistance, and the establishment of 
benefit levels. States could decide whether to operate new food stamp and employment and 
training programs, or whether to shift some welfare functions to local governments (Bowman 
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2002, 11).”  While this Act was hailed as a progressive step in the right direction for state 
autonomy in the implementation of public policy, and a victory for the devolution crowd, time 
has not been kind to this form of intergovernmental redistribution of power. 
 From the implementation of the PRWOR Act, through the beginning of G.W. Bush's 
Presidency, devolution has not delivered what many thought it could.  The Welfare reform 
championed under Reagan, G.H.W. Bush and Clinton was interspersed with non-devolutionary 
mandates that hampered state based control of the policy process.  The problem was that the 
government was saying one thing and doing another (which shouldn't be terribly shocking to 
anyone): “Paul Posner's research on federal mandates found that, even in the aftermath of 
passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, new federal mandates were imposed and more 
preemptions were enacted (Bowman 2002, 12).”  
 The Clinton Administration is the beginning of the clashing policy goals of the 
opportunistic federalism that Conlan (2006) termed and will be discussed later.  Competing 
policy preferences begin to be injected into the structure of intergovernmental relations.  Once 
they began to conflict with each other the nature of federalist relations became fundamentally 
flawed.  The big shift in this new form of federalism came with the G.W. Bush administration. 
 Much like the coercive and new federalism eras, the period from Reagan to midway 
through Clinton's presidency, about 1995, saw certain key events tie together with governmental 
trends that affected the functioning of federalism.  The population shift from the frostbelt to the 
sunbelt that began in the 1960's helped the Republicans take control of Congress.  The declining 
rate of federal aid to states and localities prompted an end to General Revenue Sharing.  Not only 
was the cost of health care increasing, causing a shift in funding at the national and state levels (a 
fight that is ongoing to this day), but the increas in regulatory federalism, like the 
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implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, have not slowed down.  The recent 
passage of the Affordable Care Act, and its subsequent implementation, will surely have a drastic 
impact on health care in the United States, but time is needed to see the full effects of the new 
policy. 
 Clinton's second term in office saw the end of one of the most important 
intergovernmental bodies ever established at the fed ral level: the ACIR (Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations).  This Commission, si ce its inception in 1959, had been tasked 
with seven goals to help facilitate the flow of intergovernmental policies from the federal to the 
local level:  
1. common problems affecting the federal, state, and local governments; 2. the administration 
and coordination of federal grants and other programs; 3. the conditions and controls associated 
with federal grants; 4. technical assistance to the executive and legislative branches of the federal 
government, including review of proposed legislation t  determine its possible effect on the 
federal system; 5. emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental 
cooperation; 6. the most desirable allocation of functions, responsibilities, and revenues among 
the federal, state, and local governments; and 7. coordination and simplification of tax laws and 
administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship 
between the federal, state, and local governments and to reduce the burden of compliance for 
taxpayers (McDowell 1997, 112). 
 
The recommendations given by the commission varied widely depending on what current model 
of federalism was in place.  In the beginning, its recommendations were focused on the 
functioning of state and local governments as much as they were on the federal government.  The 
grant-in-aid programs were the primary concern of their federal recommendations while reform 
of tax codes and county governing were the majority of their state and local recommendations 
(McDowell 1997, 113). 
 It wasn't until Reagan took office that the ACIR began to focus almost solely on the 
federal government:  “(the) ACIR was among the first to warn of the rising burdens on state and 
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local governments resulting from the multiplication f federal preemptions, mandates, and grant 
conditions. Commission task forces and reports were influential in shaping the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 as well as the 1980 federal fiscal notes legislation upon which the 
1995 law was built (McDowell 1997, 113-14).”  The Republican led Contract with America 
under Clinton was the beginning of the end for the ACIR.  During the government shutdown the 
Republican members in the ACIR took over the debate and policy recommendation process; 
thereby winnowing down the amount of mandates they felt the state and local governments 
should have to implement (McDowell 1997, 116).  These actions can be seen as Republicans 
longing for Reagan's new, new federalism, and fightin  against what they perceived as too much 
federal government regulation of matters state and local governments were more than capable of 
handling themselves. 
 The ACIR wasn't terminated because it was not doing a good job of assessing the various 
intergovernmental challenges that had been cropping up since Reagan's Presidency; in fact the 
ACIR had pointed to several challenges that needed some sort of governmental response:  
 A study of principles for the proper allocation of functions among the federal, state, and 
 local governments to see whether the system can rely on anything more solid than deficit-
 driven federalism during the next few tumultuous political years; Assistance in convening 
 and supporting a "conference of the states" to consider strengthening the constitutional 
 and statutory positions of the states in relation t  the federal government; Means of 
 accelerating implementation of the nationwide computer network for exchanging 
 criminal records to let law-enforcement officers che k the backgrounds of suspects being 
 temporarily detained, thereby keeping repeat offenders off the streets; Additional studies 
 on public works investment policies to help the central cities; and Much more work on 
 federal mandates (McDowell 1997, 120).   
 
This was a time when a commission like the ACIR was a valuable asset for the federal 
government to use as a guiding light for fixing intergovernmental problems.  The National 
Performance Review done by Al Gore at the request of Bill Clinton even recommended that the 
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ACIR be “reinvented and revitalized.”  Of all things, the federal budget deficit ended up killing 
the commission (McDowell 1997, 120-21). 
 An intergovernmental commission like the ACIR is a great commodity for the 
government to have.  Federalism issues are not always black and white.  The complicated 
relationships between the various levels of governmt need coordinated and cooperative 
guidance to affect proper policy implementation and guard against preemptions and mandates 
that could be extremely harmful to state and local governments.  Like most political issues in the 
United States, the budget deficit and political partis nship came first: 
 ACIR was a collaborative body. It worked by consensus throughout most of its thirty-
 seven year history. Thus, the loss of consensus on ma y domestic policy issues made 
 ACIR's role more difficult, particularly as those policy differences became more 
 politically divisive. This problem did not appear suddenly. Its roots went back to the early 
 1980s when the role of government came under attack, federal aid began shifting from 
 places to persons and away from local governments to the states, the federal government 
 began relying less on regional solutions to regional problems, and the national 
 associations representing state and local governments-the organizations that nominated 
 the state and local members of ACIR to the president-b gan having less common ground 
 on which to reach agreements through ACIR (McDowell 1997, 122).  
 
Reagan's legacy of smaller government, less federal control/regulations, and a general malaise 
for intergovernmental relations was finally affecting the day-to-day functioning of government.  
The decline of the ACIR didn't just appear out of nwhere.  Reagan's federalism slowly began 
dissolving intergovernmental commissions/boards/agencies throughout the government in an 
effort to cut waste.  In 1981 the House of Representatives renamed its IGR subcommittee and 
gave it new duties that slowly eroded its IGR agenda.  In 1986, when the Senate came under 




 The slow erosion of intergovernmental control mechanisms during Reagan's presidency 
didn't end with the House and the Senate.  In fact it continued through George H.W. Bush's term: 
 The congressional practice of reviewing ACIR's performance every five years was 
 discontinued after 1984...the General Accounting Office concluded that there was no 
 longer a constituency for its own intergovernmental s udies office, and disbanded it in 
 1990. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Intergovernmental Personnel Programs in OPM had 
 been disbanded in 1981, and OMB's intergovernmental rel tions office followed suit in 
 1983. The White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs-first established in 1956-has 
 been more of a liaison with mayors, governors, and other state and local officials than a 
 policy shop throughout most of its life.21 Clearly, the perception of a need for general 
 purpose intergovernmental specialists had waned in Washington, D.C. It is now almost 
 completely gone (McDowell 1997, 123). 
 
The ACIR's death midway through Clinton's Presidency should have not come as a surprise.  Not 
only had various bodies similar to it been dissolved, but the ACIR's budget had been cut in half 
during the 80's (McDowell 1997, 124) as part of the war on waste; another example of Reagan's 
attack on traditional intergovernmental relations.   
 One of the major ways the George W. Bush administrat on changed intergovernmental 
relations for the foreseeable future was the passage of the PATRIOT Act and the subsequent 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, now a standing committee in Congress.  The 
broad, and seemingly vice-like, grasp Homeland Security was given over the entire nation was 
unprecedented.  This was a massive increase in the scope of federal power because the new 
department was given almost unlimited control to circumvent state, and even Constitutional, 
laws during times of crisis.  This albatross around the neck of the Constitution is, unfortunately, 
here to stay.  For the past 14 years the U.S. governm nt has considered itself engulfed in a period 
of crisis because terrorism still exists and is still a threat to the peace, welfare, and security of 
U.S. citizens at home and abroad.  This state of crisis gives Homeland Security the ability to 
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negate certain parts of the Bill of Rights and other federal/state laws that are supposed to protect 
civil liberties. 
 James Madison, quite presciently, wrote in The Federalist Papers, “The operations of the 
federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the 
State governments, in times of peace and security (Madison 1788, No. 45).”  In a perpetual state 
of war and danger, the state and local governments mu t cede power to whatever arm of the 
national government is given control over the protection from danger until the danger is gone.  
The flaw in the current line of reasoning is that terrorism will never go away, and if it never 
leaves then there will always be a state of emergency.  The national government has given itself 
pseudo-permanent preemptive power over many policy decisions that could, and should, be 
handled by states and localities.  
 George W. Bush's administration began to pursue its immediate interests with little, or no, 
regard for the institutional, intergovernmental, and collective consequences of these policy 
actions.  This opportunistic way of governing hurts every level of government because of the 
chaos and confusion it creates.  The federal mandates, policy preemptions, and grant programs 
used by G.W. Bush, and later Obama, put varying individual, political, and jurisdictional goals 
over what should be the government's goal of shared interests and cooperation.  The Obama 
administration has attempted to halt some of these competing policy preferences and has been 
successful in some areas. 
 Key events during Clinton's second term through G.W. Bush's second term were catalysts 
for the various shifts in federalism trends that had preceded them.  Welfare reform, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, the subsequent passage of the PATRIOT Act and the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Bush v Gore decision, and the ineptness of No Child Left 
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Behind are all manifestations of the shift to an opportunistic model of federalism.  Mandates, 
preemptions and regulations began to dramatically increase.  An increase in the federal budget 
deficit accompanied a surge in the usage of block grants by the federal government.  The upturn 
in state and local privatization (like the prison system) was a sign that the federal government 
was willing during this period to give some power back to the states.  This rise in privatization 
was coupled with more state innovations at the administrative level, like civil service reform, that 
began to be applied more nationally. 
 The G.W. Bush administration faced numerous challenges to federalism, not all of which 
were the administration's fault.  Unfortunately theway in which they were dealt with was not 
conducive to progress.  Many of the factors were out of the administration's control and have 
continued into Obama's presidency:  
 Demographic changes-an aging population and increased ethnic diversity-will 
 reverberate across governmental levels. Population m bility, especially the re-centering 
 of the populace in a southern and western direction, c ntinues. The economic boom of 
 the late 1990s has slowed; now many state governments are falling victim to overly 
 optimistic revenue projections. Health-care costs are escalating rapidly, and some of the 
 most innovative state managed-care plans are threaten d. Federal grants to state and local 
 governments are on the rise, constituting 17.9 percent of the fiscal year 2002 budget. 
 However, payments to individuals constitute an ever-increasing proportion of those 
 federal outlays: 11.4 percent in 2002, compared to 8.0 percent in 1992. The issues run the 
 gamut. The federalization of crime continues with the Bush administration's proposals for 
 additional federal gun-crimes. With the reauthorization of the 1965 Elementary and 
 Secondary Education Act, more federal government involvement in public schools is a 
 certainty...At the same time, the growing threat of catastrophic terrorism on U.S. soil is 
 encouraging a new form of intergovernmental cooperation: terrorism prevention. 
 Interstate cooperation is on the rise. The number of interstate compacts has reached an 
 all-time high; the use of joint legal action by states has never been greater. In states with 
 direct democracy, the increased use of ballot initiatives is posing real challenges to 
 representative democracy. In the international enviro mental arena, the United States is 
 likely to face demands that it lower its emission f greenhouse gases, an action that 
 would have broad domestic consequences...The only certain outcome is the continued 
 evolution of the federal system. As Martha Derthick has said, "American federalism is a 
 highly protean form, long on change and confusion, short on fixed, generally accepted 




The way in which the federal and state governments approach these issues will determine how a 
new era of federalism will manifest itself.  The current Opportunistic model really sees no 
problem with the variety and interconnectedness of these problems.  It almost seems like the 
opportunistic approach uses a “Kill 'em all and let God sort them out” mentality that refuses to 
believe that there are dangerous consequences to dic nnected policy decisions. 
 It is a little difficult, and unfair, to criticize the current administration before it is over and 
can be placed into a historic context, but some of the policy goals and federalist tendencies can 
be seen and analyzed.  Obama's federalism has been focused on reversing certain G.W. Bush 
policies and the institution of a more active federal government.  The Stimulus Bill in Obama's 
first term and the Affordable Care Act of his second term are two great examples of the national 
government attempting to be more of an active and driving force behind governance than a 
passive and reactionary one.  Administrative agencies have become more prominent under the 
current administration than during the previous one.  States are being used as the laboratories of 
democracy that they were originally seen as by the founding fathers.  Under Obama's federalism 
states have been pitted against each other to receive federal grant money, which isn't necessarily 
a bad thing.  Forcing competition among the states has yielded innovations that may not have 
come to pass if the process for receiving grant money wasn't as rigorous, like the Work Fare 
program to get people off of welfare.  These innovati ns, like the ones seen in the Race to the 
Top program, are then being adopted at the national leve .   
 The one area that has not changed under Obama's administration is the expansion of 
federal power that began under G.W. Bush.  The problem that this power expansion creates has to 
deal with the supremacy clause because, if and when enforced, the federal government can 
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supersede any state actions that it deems unconstitutional.  The erosion of certain constitutional 
rights that began under G.W. Bush with the passage of the PATRIOT Act has not stopped, and in 
fact has increased.  One of the problems/complaints that can be thrown at the national 
government when federal power is increased at the exp nse of state power is that the subsidiary 
principle may be violated.  This principle is not alw ys ignored when the federal government 
takes/is given more power.  The concept behind the principle is that government responsibility 
resides with the lowest level that can provide it.  If the national government is the only branch 
that can legitimately provide a service then that service should stay in the federal government's 
control.   
 The fundamental theory behind the subsidiary principle makes sense as long as there are 
not competing government interests fighting to get their piece of the pie, like the form of 
federalism the United States has been experiencing for the past fourteen years.  This principle 
creates a need for accountability.  Accountability can force agencies to accomplish their tasks in 
efficient and effective ways.  If a level of government is tasked with the responsibility of 
administering a policy, then that responsibility must come with accountability even if the project 
is a failure.  The accountability created can also work as a method to weed out what types of 
policies certain levels of government cannot handle on their own.  This principle can create more 








Issues with the Opportunistic System 
Before discussing many of G.W. Bush’s policy mistakes, the concept of opportunistic 
federalism needs to be looked at as discussed by one of its leading scholars, Tim Conlan (2006).  
He chronicled the shift from cooperative to opportunistic federalism, and the summation of his 
analysis is “(Opportunistic Federalism is) characterized by corrosive opportunistic behavior, 
greater policy prescriptiveness, eroding institutional capacity for intergovernmental analysis, and 
shifting paradigms of public management. These trends threaten to undermine effective 
intergovernmental relations and management (Conlan 2006, 663).”  All of these critiques can be 
found in the G.W. Bush Administration’s policy initia ives along with their respective 
implementations.  But if this system is so bad then why would it be implemented in the first 
place?  Conlan (2006) argues that, on its face, the opportunistic approach seems much better 
suited than past approaches at dealing with “the range and behavioral dynamics of contemporary 
intergovernmental behavior (Conlan 2006, 667).” 
 The relationship between public administration andfederalism cannot be overlooked in 
any analysis of administration.  The power paradigm between the federal government and 
state/local governments affects how well an administrator can effectively do his/her job.  The 
shifts in federalist models throughout the last century will surely echo the shifts in public 
administration practices because the two are inextricably linked.  Tim Conlan (2006) shows how 
the new opportunistic model of federalism has affected the practice of public administration on 
the federal and state levels.   
 Conlan proposes that opportunistic federalism has taken over from the cooperative 
model, and this has shifted the foundations of Public Administration.  This hostile takeover has 
been evidenced by four main themes: corrosive opportunistic behavior, greater policy 
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prescriptiveness, shifting paradigms of public management, and the erosion of institutional 
capacity for intergovernmental analysis (Conlan 2006, 663).  Of course these events did not pop 
up overnight.  They slowly evolved through the years s new models of federalism were played 
with by the government.  Conlan (2006) begins his analysis with an overview of the Kestnbaum 
Commission of 1955, which convened under the Eisenhower presidency with the goal of finding 
a way for federalism to successfully administrate federal, state and local governmental goals.  
The Commission's goals were to decide: the merits of federalism, analyze federal forbearance, 
modernize state and local governmental systems, endorse the idea of cooperative federalist 
practices and find the best way to institutionalize int rgovernmental coordination and analysis.  
Conlan (2006) notes that the commission’s recommendations were met with unusual success and 
throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, in part thanks to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 
1968, cooperative federalism blossomed (Conlan 2006, 664-666). 
The political culture in the U.S. is constantly changing.  Today the opportunistic approach 
to federalism seems, to many politicians at every lvel of government, to be the best way to get 
their policies enacted.  Conlan argues that G.W. Bush’s administration was the best example to 
date of this ouroborosian policy agenda: “opportunistic federalism has been abundantly 
demonstrated in the Bush administration. One would be hard pressed to develop an 
intergovernmental agenda that was more dismissive of co perative norms and traditional 
responsibilities (Conlan 2006, 667).”  Bush’s administration showed the glaring weakness of this 
policy approach and the disorganized policies enacted by this administration continue to hurt this 
country.  Conlan (2006) ends his article by arguing that if the Opportunistic policy approach is 
allowed to continue, then the intergovernmental system of the US will continue to disintegrate 
and weaknesses will become magnified.  Globalization and the constantly changing economy 
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are, and will continue to be, affected by this federalist approach.  Change is needed.  Conlan 
(2006, 673-674) argues that a more cooperative appro ch must be taken and it “requires the 
political will to resist opportunistic politics and to rebuild a culture of intergovernmental 
comity.” 
Unfortunately for the cooperative fans, the new paradigm that was driving federalism 
began to unravel until it became the opportunistic ystem known today.  Conlan (2006) points to 
the proliferation of federal mandates and preemptions, the paradigm shift from 
intergovernmental management to performance management, the erosion of institutionalized and 
systematic analysis of the intergovernmental system, and the pure disregard for state and local 
governments from the federal tax policy as the key d ath nails in the cooperative model’s coffin 
(Conlan 2006).   
George W. Bush’s two terms as president at the beginning of the new millennium will 
rightfully go down as one of the most controversial presidencies of all time.  There had not been 
a president since Richard Nixon that so polarized the nation; people either loved or hated Bush.  
His policy decisions were hailed by many as fantastic and by others as foolish power plays.  
Many see his time as president as a huge failure that only hurt this country.  Putting the War in 
Afghanistan aside, since that was inevitable no matter who had been president after the 9/11 
attacks, it was his use of competing ideals of federalism throughout his terms that hurt him.  He 
would, with some policies, attempt to strengthen the federal government and then turn around 
and enact policies that tried to strengthen state power.  History has shown that once a president 
chooses one federalist route to go down, it is bestto keep on that path.  Competing avenues for 
federalism only seem to muddle up the administration’s goals.  The policies eventually begin to 
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cancel each other out leaving nothing changed and cusing a big mess for the next administration 
to clean up. 
 One policy area where a president can assert his/her idea of federalism is Welfare Policy: 
should it be left up to the individual states to deci  how it is apportioned, or should the Supreme 
Court be given the right to make a legally binding process that all states must follow when 
implementing welfare policy?  Under Bush’s Presidency: 
 Welfare programs have become more restrictive and behaviorally demanding…Core 
 state functions have been contracted out to private providers, devolved to lower 
 jurisdictions, and restructured as competitive markets…[which has led to] the rise of a 
 mode of poverty governance that is, at once, more muscular in its normative enforcement 
 and diffuse in its organization (Fording, Schram and Soss 2008, 536). 
 
Welfare Policy under George W. Bush was an attempt to show that in his administration’s eyes 
this matter of federalism was more of a political question than a Constitutional one.  Instead of 
letting the federal government, or the Supreme Court decide, the policy’s power has been 
devolved and privatized in an attempt to make welfar  a non-judiciable policy area.  This policy 
decentralization has been seen as a way to strengthen the states' “right hand” so that the central 
government doesn’t have to deal with it; it is seen as a pragmatic solution to the problem 
(Fording, Schram and Soss 2008, 536-37).  These authors also show how this policy has been 
left up to the states' discretion even more; some state  have been allowed to devolve TANF 
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) authority to local authorities and some have chosen 
not to.  This was not a decision of the US Supreme Court.  It has been left to the states to decide 
as a way for Bush to show that he was a states' rights guy (Fording, Schram and Soss 2008, 550). 
 Of course no discussion about G.W. Bush’s presidency would be complete without a 
discussion of the 2000 election.  It was the closest election in recent memory and one of only 
four presidential elections where the victor took the Electoral College without winning the 
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popular vote.  The intervention into the election recount by the US Supreme Court, the 
subsequent declaration by the court that Florida’s Supreme Court had violated the Constitution, 
and the calling of the election for Bush were all watershed events that would set the stage for 
many of Bush’s judicial-centered policy decisions and his strengthening of the federal 
government.  The 2000 election also led to widespread distrust in the government along with a 
feeling that Bush, and his administration, had the power to do whatever they wanted. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision only served to delegitimize national elections in many 
people’s view.  It also set a precedent for Bush’s terms: when in doubt lean on friends in the 
Supreme Court.  After the election, many people around the country felt a complete distrust in 
not only the national government, but in the electoral system as well (and this would continue 
throughout G.W. Bush’s two terms).  Many saw the elctoral process as unfair, and why 
shouldn’t they?  In most people’s view he who wins the popular vote should become President, 
even though many don’t quite understand that Americans live in a representative democracy with 
an Electoral College, not a philosophically perfect “one person, one equal vote” democracy 
(Craig 2006, 579).   
 The election results, and people’s feelings towards the election, seemed to undercut 
almost everything G.W. Bush did while in office.  Many thought he was an illegitimate president 
and the clashing policies he enacted seemed to be trying to serve two masters at the same time.  
He would enact policies to strengthen the federal government to appease those on the left who 
didn’t think the election was legitimate and then enact state-centered policies to appease voters 
on the right.  Both of these become increasingly difficult when the populace exhibits political 
distrust, feels dissatisfaction with democracy, has a feeling that the government can be extremely 
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unresponsive to the will of the populace, and believ s the Presidency is illegitimate (Craig 2006, 
582-83).  
 The delegitimization of the Electoral College the 2000 election brought also held 
consequences for the future of electoral federalism.  Though the results surprised many people, 
this was not the first time that a President won the Electoral College without winning the popular 
vote.  It had happened three times previously, thoug  the last time was in the 1800's so the 
collective memory of the American populace had forgotten.  Calls for electoral reform began to 
spread across the country and this issue became important to most of the smaller states, not 
geographically small but population-wise since the El ctoral College gives small states a 
disproportional electoral advantage.  This brought up an intriguing federalism question: could the 
national government mandate change among the states?  People realized very quickly that 
Constitutionally the federal government could not because of the process through which 
Constitutional Amendments must go through: “Even if there were sufficient congressional 
support to pass a constitutional amendment terminating the college, ratification by the required 
three-fourths of states is improbable. Smaller state  have no incentive to support an amendment 
that lessens their influence in the process (Bowman 2002, 19).” 
 The election also brought the decentralized nature of national elections to the forefront of 
discussion.  National elections are a great example of how spread out, in a federalism 
perspective, voting regulations and rules are.  This is one area that truly requires cooperation and 
coordination between all three levels of government.  When it goes wrong, like in 2000, it goes 
really wrong.  The problems with this decentralized process were quite obvious after the election: 
“The election dramatized the degree of decentralization-and variation-in the electoral process. 
States set the rules for elections, and local governm nts, typically counties, conduct the elections. 
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States determine how much discretion their local governments have in selecting the types of 
voting machines to be used and in designing the ballots for those machines (Bowman 2002, 19).”  
This led many to call for reform.  Unfortunately tha  reform can't really be done at the federal 
level, it must be done by the states.  As of 2002, only two years after the election debacle “more 
than 1,600 election reform bills have been introduced in state legislatures, 167 have been adopted 
(Bowman 2002, 19).”  Clearly there is little interest among the states to change their electoral 
operations.  
 Another damning aspect of the election was the widespread distrust in the government it 
fostered with the African-American community in the United States.  The decisions Bush made 
throughout his presidency to quell this resentment largely fell on deaf ears and were seen as 
illegitimate (Avery 2007, 328).  Avery does point out that African-Americans have long held a 
political distrust, not necessarily for individual politicians or policies, but in the institution of 
government itself.  It isn’t hard to see why since th y have only had equal rights for about forty-
five years.  Avery shows that “mistrust of governmet among blacks is largely a function of 
unhappiness with the continued racial discrimination and racial inequality in political and 
economic power (Avery 2007, 329).”  G.W. Bush’s policies throughout his terms would never 
really hold sway with many African-Americans, especially when he got the Supreme Court 
involved (Dred Scott and Plessey v. Ferguson are still on many people’s minds). 
 The United States Supreme Court was seen by many under G.W. Bush’s terms as the bad 
guy.  The intervention into the election seemed to cloud the eyes of the public when looking at 
the Court.  The fact that the Court normally doesn’t use judicial review to step in on state-based 
legislation, or state-based legal decisions, but did in the 2000 election was odd and 
unprecedented (Howard 2004, 141).  Howard also points out that “Excessively frequent 
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assertions of judicial review…can lead to a lack of respect for the Court, political outcry to 
impeach activist judges, attempts to curtail the Court's power through restrictions of appellate 
jurisdiction, and even attempts to alter the composition of the court itself.”  This is how the Court 
has acted in the past.  With its response to the election many saw the Court overstepping its 
bounds, even if it wasn’t.  It is also interesting to see how the political ideology of the Justices 
affects their decisions, even though it isn’t supposed to.  Howard’s research shows that on 
average the Court deferred to the Reagan administration's requests, but only the liberal Justices 
deferred to Clinton (Howard 2004, 142), and the same can be said during the G.W. Bush 
administration. 
 In the beginning of G.W. Bush’s presidency the Supreme Court began to retreat from its 
policies of the last sixty years by overturning congressional statutes because they intruded into 
state sovereignty or because they exceeded the delegat d powers of Congress (Conlan 2001, 
254).  These acts were viewed as the Supreme Court moving away from centralizing government 
like it had been for a long time.  Decentralization was the new fad and G.W. Bush was fully in 
support.  In the 1990’s the Supreme Court began to restrict Congress’ powers and tried to 
strengthen state power (Conlan 2001, 256-57). 
 The Supreme Court’s move to embrace cooperative fed ralism was a retreat from the 
constitutional model of dual federalism, especially in the use of federal grants, and specifically 
conditional grants.  But “Because the Rehnquist Court continues to accept spending power 
doctrines that give Congress the ability to regulate states through conditions of aid, in ways that 
it could not do directly, a major loophole exists in the Court's state autonomy exclusions (Conlan 
2001, 269).”  The Supreme Court at the beginning of G.W. Bush’s terms seemed to be working 
against itself and only served to clutter up the whole idea of federalism. 
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 History shows that in a president’s second lame duck term his/her power and influence 
are seen as dwindling and limited.  G.W. Bush had to fight hard to continue his policies and keep 
the conception of his power strong.  Bush seemed to foll w the historic second term goal of 
increasing influence on foreign policy instead of domestic (Dunn 2006, 95-96).  This, 
unfortunately for Bush, only helped to muddle the competing federalist policies he had enacted.  
By retreating from domestic policy decisions that were at odds, and trying to settle the 
intergovernmental disputes they led to, Bush only served to show the public that things weren’t 
working like they should be.  Of course, the two wars that the United States was engaged in had 
to be addressed.  It is very possible that the G.W. Bush administration saw its competing policy 
ideologies failing and decided to abandon any idea of correcting them and just focusing on 
winning the wars it had built up as a global war against evil (public relations concerns must be 
taken into account).   
 Dunn (2006, 104-118) points to many things that affected the Bush administration during 
its second term: limited and specific tenure, gathering opposition, preparing for succession, 
divided government, personnel depletion, agenda exhustion, scandal, hubris, and the legacy of 
previous policies.  Many of these factors were influenced by the competing policies enacted in 
G.W. Bush’s first term and as history showed, served to inhibit his second term.  Strengthening 
the federal government and the state governments at the same time just wasn’t working out and it 
was only getting worse.  Conflict was rampant and failure loomed large over the presidency.  
Because of this it isn’t too difficult to see why domestic policy was abandoned for a strong 
foreign policy. 
 No discussion of G.W. Bush’s presidential terms would be complete without looking at 
the PATRIOT Act.  It is one of the most controversial bills to have come out of Bush’s 
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Presidency, even though it got close to a unanimous c n ent vote in Congress.  Though G.W. 
Bush campaigned on state’s rights, the PATRIOT Act is one of the largest expansions of the 
federal government’s power over the states in a long time.  The PATRIOT Act helps to shine a 
light on Congress’ problematic place in the separation of powers dispute, one of federalism’s 
main concerns.  Farrier argues that it is the “cycle of institutional ambivalence” where Congress 
yields power, then pulls some of that power back, and then yields some more (Farrier 2007, 93).  
The passage of this act made congress a “gatekeeper for a dramatic increase in executive power” 
as this new act addressed broad issues and delegated a lot of power into few hands (Farrier 
2007).   
 Oversight became problematic and integration into pe ple’s everyday lives received 
heavy public backlash (Farrier 2007, 94).  The problem here is that oversight is a central part of 
institutional power and without it, or when the process becomes muddled, things tend to go awry.  
Cooperation from the executive is the key to oversight n respect to checks and balances and 
without cooperation from the executive, like in this case, institutional cooperation cannot occur.  
Congress does not like to give up its power, especially to the executive, but the PATRIOT Act 
was a special event since the events that led up toit were rather unprecedented, at least in United 
States history (Farrier 2007, 96). 
 One of the most striking examples of G.W. Bush’s competing federalist tendencies was 
the passage of Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit.  This act not only created expensive new 
entitlements in support of Medicare, but it also attacked the foundations of Medicare at the same 
time (Jaenicke 2006, 217)!  How is a program supposed to work when at the same time it is 
being instituted and attacked?  This was one of the largest expansions of federal power enacted 
by G.W. Bush even though it went against his political party’s ideals.  Some argue that this was 
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actually a shift in the fundamental idea of how to c ntrol Medicare: from “program 
management” to “program transformation” which only helped to spur partisan dissent to the 
program (Jaenicke 2006, 219).  The best argument against why this was such a difficult issue is, 
“It is difficult to reconcile the creation of an expensive new entitlement with a conservative 
desire to limit the role of federal government (Jaenicke 2006, 240.)”  This act is a perfect 




















Alternatives to the Current System 
 Opportunistic Federalism is obviously not the best solution to intergovernmental 
relationship problems, but what other options are there?  Unfortunately since the inception of this 
concept there have been no new advances in the field of federalism so one must look to past 
examples for a better way forward: dual federalism, cooperative federalism, coercive federalism 
and new federalism.  After these former federalism paradigms are analyzed, new ideas about how 
the national-state relationship can move forward will be proposed. 
 In the dual model separate spheres of authority are created in the government with clearly 
demarcated lines that one governmental level, or the other, could not cross.  Cooperative 
federalism was the next theory to come because many politicians believed that dual federalism 
had become so entrenched in the political process that it was becoming increasingly difficult for 
the federal and state governments to get anything do e.  They were constantly squabbling over 
who really had the power.  The cooperative method trie  to solve this problem with a concerted 
effort to get things done and solve the problems created by the old theory.  Instead of divisive 
government that created separate policies for each arm of the government, all branches, from the 
federal down to the local branches, would work togeher to enact policy initiatives that involved 
every actor and stakeholder equally.  In theory this idea sounds wonderful, but in practice things 
become much more complicated. 
 Coercive federalism, where the national government could force the states to support a 
policy initiative they might not want by the incorpration of various coercive political methods, 
had some good and bad elements.  Crosscutting requirements (environmental regulation), 
crossover sanctions (pass a certain law or lose fedral funds), unfunded mandates (do it without 
help/$$$ from the federal government or lose federal funding), and grants-in-aid (various federal 
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grant models – categorical, block and GRS) can all be used in good ways and bad ways.  The 
important thing the government needs to realize is that if these methods are used in the right way 
intergovernmental relations can flourish.   
 The new form of federalism the Nixon administration nstituted was not restricted to just 
Nixon; both the Reagan and Clinton administrations used the same concept.  New federalism 
isn’t necessarily restricted to any one overriding goal or mission; it is used more as a term that 
refers to new models that didn’t follow their two predecessors, dual and cooperative.  Nixon’s 
administration focused on the efficient and effective management of specific goals.  Under 
Reagan’s administration the federal government took n Medicaid and the state governments 
took on welfare and food stamps.  Finally, under Clinton’s administration state powers were 
surprisingly revived under the mission statements of Reinventing Government and the Contract 
with America.  The Clinton Administration also relied on unfunded mandates to achieve its 
overall goals. 
 Fixing the mess that opportunistic federalism has created is no easy task, and while 
Obama's administration is trying to fix it, the process is nowhere near complete.  Opportunistic 
federalism clearly did not work for the G.W. Bush Administration the way some might have 
thought it would.  Thankfully the mess helped to shed light on certain criteria that must be 
addressed when trying to rectify this issue. 
 One of the primary current problems in intergovernme tal relations is how to best 
provide aid to local governments, whose revenue strams vary widely, making it difficult for 
these local governments to effectively administer th  same policy goals throughout the country.  
Some areas simply do not have the funds to do so.  Per capita expenditures are different in every 
state.  These expenditures provide a great framework to evaluate whether or not a state 
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distributed funds equally among all of its counties.  Most of the monetary aid local governments 
receive come from their state and an unequal distribution of wealth creates inequities among 
counties that effects policy implementation.  The heavy local reliance on property taxes, and the 
varying degree to which smaller levels of government r ly on them (50% of city revenue, 75% of 
county and 90% of townships) require the states and the federal government to coordinate help 
when it is needed (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 Some of the revenue solutions local governments depend on (sales tax, income tax, user 
fees, debt restrictions, and bond restrictions) cannot add up to a sufficient amount for effective 
policy implementation because of certain problems that occasionally arise and create financial 
crises (budgetary shortfalls, insufficient tax revenu , emergency situations, etc.).  Emergency 
situations, normally unforeseen and devastating, can cause some localities to default on their 
debt (a situation that is unfortunately not without precedent).  When this occurs the state must 
come in and save them because of the Constitutional premise that local governments are 
creatures of the state.  Again, in times like this coordination and cooperation are key.  
Privatization, a method of contracting out certain services so the government doesn't have to 
administer them, has been very popular among strict federalist constructionists.  This can create 
problems for local governments as well.  At its best privatization can encourage competition, 
improve service quality, and save taxpayers money.  At its worst the opposite of all three can 
happen and then the state, or federal, government must step in (Lee, Johnson and Joyce 2013). 
 Information overload causes problems in intergovernmental relations and there is more 
information available today than there ever has been.  Dealing with this overload is one of the 
keys to effectively administering a new federalism path.  The ACIR was a national body that 
could help decipher information flow between the leve s of government, and since its dissolution 
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the government has had problems communicating.  A new i tergovernmental body like the ACIR 
is necessary for a new form of federalism to emerge.  It would direct traffic to help avoid 
clustering and stagnation in policy implementation.  
 The three main criteria when addressing any politica  issue’s impact on society, and the 
decision making process that entails are: political, social and economic.  There are many sub 
groups within these three areas, but it all comes back to the main three areas.  Different 
federalism paradigms have approached the political, social, and economic aspects of policy 
change and implementation with varying degrees of success.  The alternatives to the current 
federalism model about to be discussed are an attempt to encompass these three important policy 
criteria to form a cohesive solution to the problem. 
 The political impacts of any federalist policy are extremely varied and consequential to 
the entire country, not just a few specific groups.  When evaluating a new federalist route the 
impact upon the three levels of government, federal/state/local, must be taken into consideration.  
The whole problem with the opportunistic approach was that it didn’t try to get these three 
groups working together.  Instead it dealt with one at a time without considering the impact this 
would have on the other two.  A new approach must attempt to achieve cohesiveness between the 
three levels if any positive impact on the overall framework of the government is to be had.  
Policy cooperation is necessary for any level of effectiveness, and an awareness of possible 
partisan dissent is crucial.   
 States' rights can be a somewhat loaded term.  In this instance it is defined as states being 
able to influence various governmental spheres that the national government has usurped in the 
past.  I'm not suggesting that a return to a strict constructionist view of the Tenth Amendment 
like in the dual federalism model is necessary.  Instead, allowing more state-led initiatives 
47 
 
involving policy areas that they historically had control over, like education, would facilitate an 
atmosphere of cooperation.  Policies like No Child Left Behind, and the current Common Core 
debate, erode the states' ability to regulate one of their most cherished policy arenas.  This has 
caused strife, anger and disillusionment around the country.  Removing the national 
government's control from areas like education, and giving them back to the states, would be a 
step in the right direction.       
 The social impact of policy implementation is extrmely important, especially since most 
policies have a significant emphasis on social improvement of some kind.  If the differing levels 
of government don’t address this, like opportunistic federalism fails to do, then the social level of 
said policy becomes completely muddled and incoherent.  A great example of this was the G.W. 
Bush administration’s handling of the Medicare Presc iption Drug Benefit Act.  At one level it 
tried to vastly increase the federal government’s power over this program with sweeping 
entitlement programs.  At the same time it wrote language into the bill that attacked the whole 
program’s foundation in an attempt to limit the federal government’s power.  The social impacts 
of failed policy can be somewhat hard to measure which is why it is the most difficult of the 
three variables to qualify.  Political and economic ramifications can easily be taken into account.  
In their failings, societal implications are born.  Failed health care policy not only affects the 
economy and causes political dispute, it directly affects individuals, families, and groups of 
people in different socioeconomic brackets in a negative way.  The best way to limit the negative 
social impacts of bad policy decisions is to make sure that the political and economic variables 
are solidly in place.  Positive social change can flow from there. 
 The economic impact of policy implementation might be the most visible of the three 
levels for the general population.  While the public might not really focus on the interplay 
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between different levels of the government during policy implementation, they always seem to 
focus on the economic side of any policy.  This is because most people don’t think that 
government cooperation directly affects them.  They do feel directly impacted by change in the 
economy; wallets must be protected at any cost.  Of course if a policy is enacted that has a 
detrimental economic impact then that policy will obviously become rather unpopular.  Stopping 
this from happening is extremely important for a policy’s success.  Budgetary constraints, tax 
revenues, and necessary federal aid all must be taken into account. 
 The use of federal grant money to influence the state  to acquiesce to federal mandates, 
while it might have been necessary in the past, needs to stop.  Instead, the federal government 
should use the grant system to help address the regional fiscal disparities around the country.  A 
cooperative and compassionate approach must be taken in the usage of federal funds.  Local 
revenue streams vary so widely that almost every state must constantly deal with local needs.  
Many states cannot deal with all of these economic problems themselves.  This is where the 
federal government can step in and use grant money to assist local governments in their times of 
need.  Again, an ACIR-like body at the national level could do this by analyzing the various 
budgetary and fiscal impacts of grant policy and work with state governments to allocate the 
money to places most desperately in need.    
 Fungibility also becomes an economic issue when tryi g to correct for detrimental effects 
caused at the state and local level by the opportunistic model.  Federal grant money has become 
so important to intergovernmental relations that the fungibility of a program, or the ability to 
replace that program's grant money with money from state and local sources, becomes a key 
factor in whether or not the level of government the policy has been devolved to can realistically 
fund the program.  This becomes an even bigger problem when certain policies are wide ranging.  
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Fiscal disparities abound at the state and, especially, local levels.  Changes in intergovernmental 
policies can have dramatic effects on localities because of the huge gap between local budgets 
caused primarily by property taxes.  This is why unfunded mandates are so unpopular at the state 
and local levels; some local/state governments simply cannot afford to enact unfunded policy 
changes because their revenue streams are incapable of supplying the necessary funds. 
 So under the already established criteria for a successful federalism policy which 
alternative would best suit all three?  It would seem obvious that every form of federalism would 
attempt to balance all three criteria, political/social/economic, but this is harder to do than it 
seems in theory:  
 The question to be raised here is not whether mode federalism has become inefficient 
 due to a decision-making process trapped in overlap-ping lines of authority...Once more, 
 it is about a disjuncture in the history and tradition of federalism as a system of divided 
 governance, and once again we return to the ninth Federalist Paper, in which Hamilton 
 had told his readers that the purpose of such a division of powers was to separate the 
 "general authority of the union" from governance for "local purposes." Such governance 
 would be sustained, he extended further, by leaving to the states "certain exclusive and 
 very important portions of sovereign power” (Hueglin 2003, 287).  
  
 For many decades dual federalism seemed to be balancing these criteria very well.  All 
levels of government seemed to be functioning together within the separate spheres of authority 
that were established.  The political, social and economic impacts of policies were working for a 
while but eventually everything began to disintegrate.  It would seem that the dual model could 
successfully regulate the economic and social aspect  of federalism, but as history showed it is 
the political aspect that it cannot control very well.  The separate spheres of government created 
under the dual model could not ever seem to agree on wh m actually had the most power. 
 The reverse can be seen in the cooperative model; the political aspect is handled rather 
well, but the economic and social aspects become quit complex and competitive because of the 
50 
 
use, or restriction, of federal grant money to the states.  Politically this form works because there 
is so much emphasis put on each governmental arm linking together to successfully solve 
problems and get things done.  This is where the dual model failed.  The grants-in-aid and the 
various forms of coercive federalism under the cooperative model are where it failed.  Unfunded 
mandates, economic sanctions, and various requirements were all ways that politicians held the 
economic aspect hostage to their whims.  The social aspect was also devastated under this model 
because of the economic controls over various policies.  Without proper funding, or monetary 
control, a policy cannot be as socially effective as it should be.   
 New federalism didn’t have one overriding problem, like dual and cooperative did, 
because new federalism did not follow one path.  Different presidential administrations chose 
alternate routes to their preferred federalist destination.  The consequences of these alternate 
routes were different for each administration in the pursuit of the criteria previously mentioned.  
Nixon, Reagan and Clinton all showed disadvantages in certain aspects of their federalist 
policies.  Under Clinton the economy did surprisingly well along with his social policies.  The 
one area he didn’t do well was the political aspect.  Reagan used a semi-opportunistic model to 
try to enhance the federal government and the states at the same time.  As a result the political 
side went well.  But history has shown that the economic side, as well as the social, didn’t quite 
pan out like they should have.  As a result his administration suffered in those two areas.  
Devolution of federal power to the states also hasn't seemed to work like many thought it would: 
“it appears that devolution may be more hyperbole than empirical fact. But even if interest in 
devolution per se fades away, the issue of the federal-state balance is at the heart of federalism 
and will undoubtedly remain central to public debate (Bowman 2002, 12).” 
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 The arguments for federal preemption come from many different areas and all carry a 
weight so large that preemption far outweighs the opposing views on the opposite side of the 
federalism scale.  The Court has historically backed the federal government almost every time it 
has attempted to preempt programs.  Economic and technological changes can provide an 
extremely sound justification that is hard to argue because the national government will always 
have the means to fund these innovations while stats nd localities might not be able to find the 
requisite amount of revenue.  Powerful lobbies representing a wide array of interests can push for 
various preemptions that will advance whatever cause/business they represent.  Some forget the 
political aspect of preemption and must understand hat it is not a Republican or Democrat issue.  
Both parties are fans of preemption when it is their party in control of the government; they just 
have to complain about it when the opposing party is in power to look good for their 
constituents.  Finally, a social component of preemption sometimes overlooked is that a lot of the 
time our society likes to see issues facing the country in the vague and general term of “rights” 
which historically have been protected by the national government.  These incentives have the 
ability to overpower the federal government and can loud the reasoning of certain agencies and 
policy makers when faced with such an easy, and legitimate, excuse to take control of public 
policy.  
 The coordination principle must be followed for successful intergovernmental relations.  
National, state and local governments have to work t gether because neither one of the three 
branches can handle every task that modern society throws at it.  Putting aside the gigantic task 
of successfully maintaining an operational infrastructure covering three million+ square miles 
and serving 315 million+ citizens, which is mind boggling by itself, the simple everyday tasks of 
governmental functions are spread across all three b anches: transportation, sewage, garbage, 
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budgeting, welfare programs, health care, etc.  Because of all these issues coordination and 

























 Opportunistic federalism clearly causes more problems than it should.  As a federalist 
policy it has failed, yet it is still in use even though Bush’s terms in office proved that this theory 
did not work.  Today it is the leading form of federalist theory and many politicians seem to love 
it, probably because it allows them to pursue their immediate interests and show their 
constituents that they have delivered what they promised they would without having to worry 
about the detrimental side effects these policies have on other areas of the government.  
American governmental policy under G.W. Bush was a complete mess.  While the opportunistic 
model might have seemed like a good idea in the beginning, its weaknesses became 
overwhelmingly apparent when new policies showed the different levels of government didn’t 
know if they were coming or if they were going.  Each level of government was being 
strengthened and weakened at the same time.  By looking at past forms of federalism I believe a 
new approach can be taken that incorporates various aspects of each trend that worked well 
while getting rid of the trends that did not work.  If the Bush administration had done this, things 
would have gone a lot differently. 
 In light of the alternatives to the current model c rtain intergovernmental functions must 
be put into place to help nudge federalism in a different and better direction.  The weaknesses in 
the current opportunistic system can be mended by instituting change on both conceptual and 
practical levels.  The modern preference for federal p eemption and mandates needs to be 
curtailed and directed more towards state-led innovati ns and initiatives.  This can be done by   
instituting an intergovernmental body similar to the ACIR on the national level to help direct, 
coordinate and communicate policy change/implementatio  between the levels of government 
(much like the second-order devolution discussed later).  
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 There have been some recent suggestions for the fuure progression of federalism in the 
United States and some of these would be valuable additions to the current model.  They attempt 
to address the problems local and state governments have had recently with the usurpation of 
power by the national government.  These new suggestions also bring the idea of states being 
laboratories of democracy back into the forefront of discussion.  Saving the government money 
will always be popular among voters and these new ideas argue that state and local innovation of 
policy initiatives can bring about desired change at a smaller cost to the taxpayer than if the 
national government was in charge.  This idea adheres to the subsidiarity principle which needs 
to be applied more than it has been in recent federalism paradigms.  A new course of federal 
government activity needs to be set, one that includes public choice.  
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 The graph on the previous page, taken from Bowman's article, shows the 5 different paths 
federalism could take after Bush's Presidency (Bowman 2002, 5).  The vagueness of these 
pathways is addressed by Bowman (2002, 5-6):  
 The federalism scenarios make no assumptions about the length of time represented by 
 the dotted lines. It is quite possible, even likely, that the next decade or two will see 
 several of these trends unfold at different periods.  Increases may be followed by 
 decreases, periods of no change could be interspersed among upward or downward 
 trends.5 However, if in 2010 or 2020, one were to look back in an attempt to measure the 
 direction of federalism since 2001, one of these fiv  paths will be proven accurate. 
 
These pathways to a new federalism model encompass v rious scenarios where the federal 
government, or the state and local governments, attempt to assert themselves in a greater 
capacity than they were during G.W. Bush's terms or in a smaller capacity.  Growth of the federal 
government's power is not necessarily an institutional evil.  In fact the continued growth during 
the 20th century was necessary in most instances.  The problem facing the federal government 
during Clinton and Bush's presidencies was the schizop renic way in which policy preemptions 
and mandates were used.   
 The call for less government, championed by Reagan and his cohorts, did not diminish 
after he left office.  George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush all decreed that 
government should be, and would be, smaller.  So one would assume that of the trends from 
Bowman's chart, option (c), (d), or (e) would have occurred since Bush's first term beginning in 
2001.  As we have seen this is not the case.  At the beginning of G.W. Bush's first term it seemed 
like option (c) would be followed and the growth in federal power would stabilize and become a 
little more static.  Surprisingly the opposite happened: a combination of options (b) and (c). 
 The modern problem federalism faces is a battle between two ideological bases: one that 
espouses public choice and competition and one thatdecries choice and competition.  
56 
 
Reconciling these two models is, at present, one of the biggest problems facing 
intergovernmental relations.  The disagreement betwe n the two camps is summarized in 
Bowman's (2002) article: Michael Greve, advocating the public choice model, is quoted “The 
federalism I have in mind-real federalism-aims to pr vide citizens with choices among different 
sovereigns, regulatory regimes, and packages of government services...Citizen choice and state 
competition are the chief virtues of federalism (Bowman 2002, 9).”  The opposing view held by 
Paul Peterson argues: “states may engage in a race to th bottom as competition to attract mobile 
taxpayers compels them to lower taxes and, therefore, reduce the range and quality of services. 
When state and local governments have economic developm nt as their main objective and when 
the federal government assumes the major responsibility for redistributive policy, then the price 
of federalism can be kept to an acceptable level (Bowman 2002, 9).” 
 Neither one of these arguments is completely corret in its assertions.  Federalism is not a 
black and white issue, no matter what some of the dual model supporters might say.  Taxpayers 
like having a say in how policies are implemented an paid for.  That is their right as tax paying 
citizens.  But, the states also have a responsibility to do what is in the best interest of their 
citizenry and sometimes this has to go against the will of the populace.  Occasionally the federal 
government must step in and take over when the taxpayers and state governments are refusing to 
cooperate with the common good (just look to the cor ive era for reasons why). 
 Local governments must own up to their share of fault for the modern hindrances in 
intergovernmental policy.  Recently the dispute hasbeen whether local governments should 
interact with the state and national government in a government or a governance capacity: “At 
issue is determining the optimal method for reducing the fiscal, social, and environmental 
disparities found in today's metropolis (Taylor 2007, 119).”  The differences between the two 
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boil down to the classic federalism argument between strong centralized power or strong 
state/local power; 
 The government model: strong, centralized governmental institutions are in the best 
 position to internalize the costs associated with urbanization and create efficiencies that 
 heretofore have not been possible (Rusk 1999; 2003). The government model implies 
 "formal institutions and elections and established decision-making processes and 
 administrative structures," forming "a legitimate monopoly that takes responsibility for 
 both providing and producing public services" (Taylor 2007, 120). 
  
The governance model: Regionalism, the governance model suggests that regional 
 problems can be solved with the participation and cooperation of local governments 
 "rather than at their expense" (Nolon 1999, 1012)...voluntary cooperation among existing 
 institutions...may take the form of consolidation f governmental functions or extensive 
 use of intergovernmental agreements...horizontally linked organizations have the ability 
 to increase effectiveness and efficiency at a lower political cost and are thus a more 
 realistic solution than formal realignment of government hierarchies (Orfield 2002; 
 Savitch and Vogel 2000; Thurmaier and Wood 2004) (Taylor 2007, 121). 
  
 Currently the governance model seems like the most practical of the two.  The vast 
expansion of federal power and responsibility that e United States has been experiencing since 
the late 1990's does not need to include local boundary disputes that could easily be solved at the 
local level, like the subsidiarity principle argues should happen.  This model might also help 
alleviate local fears of too much federal control and intrusion into regional matters.  This does 
not seem like a governmental area the national governm nt should be involved in.  Occasionally 
the state might need to help settle disputes, but what is the point of having local/regional 
governments if they are not allowed to do anything o  their own?  The only time the federal 
government would need to get involved is if there was a dispute over federally owned 
land/property or a legal dispute involving the supremacy clause.  
 Political success, both practically and figuratively, needs consistency.  If policies need to 
be enacted to strengthen one arm of the government, whether it is the federal, state or local, 
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another policy can't be put into place that attempts to disarm the one that originally tried to be 
strengthened!  This was the G.W. Bush presidency in a nutshell.  This practice must cause public 
administrators around the nation a series of never ending headaches.  How can agencies 
effectively administer public policies when they are being asked to administer competing and 
ideologically opposed policies?  Not only have the organizational changes in the executive 
branch, at the federal level, increased this confusion, but Conlan (2006) argues that the tools and 
processes of intergovernmental analysis, coordinatio , and consultation have fallen by the 
wayside. 
 A cooperative approach must be taken by the three levels of government for any success 
to occur.  A combination of the cooperative approach nd the dual approach seems like it could 
work very well.  The worst aspect of the dual approach was the best aspect of the cooperative 
approach, the political aspect.  The best facet about the dual approach, the economic and social 
aspect, was the worst facet about the cooperative appro ch.  Had the G.W. Bush administration, 
and the current Obama administration, tried to fuse these two theories together a lot of the 
current mess would have been cleaned up, or wouldn’t even exist at all.   
 The dual approach was absolutely correct in creating separate spheres of authority.  All 
three levels of government can’t have the same amount of power or else nothing would ever get 
done as they would just veto each other.  But how these authoritative spheres interact with each 
other is the important facet that the cooperative approach can help facilitate.  By injecting the 
problem solving and departmental cohesiveness strategies of the cooperative approach into the 
separate spheres of the dual approach many intergovrnmental problems would be solved. 
 What should not be incorporated from the cooperative approach are the coercive aspects 
(mandates, sanctions, etc…) and many of the grants-in aid.  Not all of these are bad approaches 
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because sometimes states don’t follow certain policies that the rest of the country is instituting 
and sometimes these policies need to be followed, i. . environmental policies.  The federal 
government obviously must step in with some form of requirements, but a lot of these sanctions 
hurt the overall economic health of federalist policy.  By taking these economic factors out of the 
new combined model and using the form that the dual approach used, the problems that the 
cooperative model faced would be solved.   
 While federal policy control is very important when it comes to large, over-arching 
policy areas, like health care and defense, smaller policy arenas should be approached with the 
subsidiarity principle in mind.  There is a limit to how much power the national government can, 
and should, take away from the states before warning sirens should be sounded.   If a policy can 
be effectively and efficiently administered by a lower level of government then it should be.  
Letting administrators who work closest to the peopl  that policy change directly affects allows 
for a fundamental understanding of how the people will react to that policy.  This has been one of 
the problems with unfunded mandates.  The federal government sometimes doesn't see how 
detrimental forcing localities to institute change can be, not only on the administration of their 
agencies, but also on their budgets and revenue streams.  The subsidiarity principle, if followed 
correctly, also allows for better cooperation and coordination between the levels of government. 
 If the subsidiarity principle is to be followed, then how should it be implemented?  There 
are two ways in which states can become the laboratories of democracy they were meant to be: 
preemption or diffusion.  Preemption, or the federal government mandating the spread and 
development of a new policy initiative that is successful in one state to every other state by 
making it a federal law, is not popular among state-centered federalists.  It has been done 
correctly and incorrectly in the past with varying results in both instances.  Diffusion, a more 
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popular mechanism for state-centered federalists, and one that more closely resembles the 
subsidiarity principle, is when a policy initiative naturally spreads to all of the other states 
through whatever means available until it has been adopted by most, if not all, states (Bowman 
2002, 13).  The difference can be seen in the chart from Bowman's article: 
  
 
 The problem with choosing either model is the way in which states have lost the power to 
do option (a) because of policy supremacy the federal government has taken over the years: 
 In some types of legislation, federal minimum standards are implemented by states (and 
 localities). The federal government sets the bar; the states devise a way of reaching it. 
 Different states use different methods to achieve compliance. In federalism terms, this is 
 a fairly hollow arrangement. States have lost the ability to first, set the standard, and 
 second, to decide without penalty whether to adopt the federal standard. States are simply 
 charged with customizing the administrative apparatus to fit the state context. The key 
 decisions about policy direction and funding are made at the national level. Granted, 
 states typically have the latitude to exceed the federally prescribed minimum standard, if 
 they desire to do so (Bowman 2002, 14).  
61 
 
Conlan (2006) points to two main factors in the evoluti n of opportunistic practices 
around the nation: social and economic changes, and new developments in the political system.  
The vast increase in federal mandates and preemptions since the 1950’s and 1960’s have come 
because of a wide variety of social causes, and injustices, that needed to be redressed.  
Economically, the acceleration of globalization has led to an increase of federal preemption 
statutes.  Politically, electoral politics has seen a vast erosion of state and local power in 
elections, especially national ones.  More detrimental to national and state politics has been the 
alarming increase in the polarization of partisan and ideological representatives.  The national 
political scene has seen a decrease in moderate politicians and a huge increase in partisan 
politicians.  All of this has led to a federalism culture that looks at how singular, immediate goals 
can be reached without concern for shared and long term goals (Conlan 2006). 
 The history of the ACIR is a great example of what not to do if the government hopes to 
maintain functional relationships between the various levels of control.  The partisanship that 
preferred ideas from sources that parroted their own views on how government should work did 
not end with Reagan or Clinton.  For federalism to work ideas need to come from nonpartisan, or 
bipartisan groups, established within the framework f the federal government, whose sole 
responsibility is limited to the effective, coordinated, and efficient dispersion of 
intergovernmental principles and policies: 
 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan probably was correct in the following remarks made 
 to the United States Senate during debate on ACIR's final appropriation, 9 November 
 1995: “...the ACIR does important, if largely unheralded, work. And we stand on the 
 brink of terminating it. This is a mistake which we will regret...without the ACIR, our 
 knowledge of important matters will never be anything more than meager. The action we 




 Is there hope for America’s federalist system?  Conlan (2006) believes there is.  He looks 
to the states in particular, probably because the natio al political scene is so divisive these days, 
and Conlan (2006) sees signs of change.  He points t  policy innovations that are occurring at the 
local and state levels.  New tax systems and procedures are being toyed with and analyzed by 
states to solve problems such as internet sales tax and other issues that affect communities far 
more than the national government.  States are alsoworking together to form shared 
environmental policies that affect certain regions of the country more than the entire nation.  
Conlan (2006) also sees the rise in popularity of state government over federal government 
among the electorate as a promising sign of growth for a foundation of power that has the chance 
to produce change in federalist policy from the ground up (Conlan 2006). 
 One option to fix the mess that opportunistic federalism has caused, and a way to point 
intergovernmental relations forward down a new path in the hopes of establishing a new 
paradigm, is implementing a form of “democratic exprimentalism” called “second-order 
devolution” in which a:  
 power shift enhances the role for local government not only to implement but also to 
 design policies and programs...(where) power is decentralized to enable citizens and other 
 actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual 
 circumstances...regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share their 
 knowledge with others facing similar problems.....Sub-national units of government are 
 broadly free to set goals and to choose the means to attain them (Bowman 2002, 14).   
  
 This form of local problem solving follows the subsidiarity principle, so it will make the 
state-centered federalists happy, and it allows for the state and federal governments to step in if 
needed.  The problem with this is that not every state, or locality for that matter, is willing to give 
so much autonomy to these municipal governments.  Strong centralized federalists might fear 
that this idea lacks certain mechanistic controls t help maintain ordered and effective policy 
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goals, but under this model it is proposed that “Congress would help finance policy and program 
experiments that the states and localities would design and implement. Congress would issue 
general, but limited, guidelines (Bowman 2002, 14).”  
 Tables 1, 2, and 3 highlight the most important federalism trends and events that have 
come up during the opportunistic paradigm’s reign.  The events near the top of the list have been 
highlighted in previous sections of this thesis (Welfar  reform, NCLB, September 11th terrorist 
attacks, the PATRIOT Act and subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
Bush v Gore, UMRA Act of 1995) because they have been the catalysts for new federalism 
trends (Weissert, Stenberg and Cole 2009).  It is fairly obvious that these events represent both 
sides of the federalism spectrum.  They either streng hen state power or national power.  The 
trends these events have produced, as seen in table 3, have been two-sided as well, but the two 
overwhelming trends involve the use of federal power to supersede state power: increased 
mandates, preemptions and regulations, block grants for welfare and children's health and day-
care programs (Weissert, Stenberg and Cole 2009).  These are the trends that need to be slowly 
rolled back and replaced by trends like state innovati n and privatization, which are both near the 
top of table 3; a good sign for the future of federalism. 










 A new approach to federalism is needed for American government to get back on track.  
It is always difficult for the dominant paradigm to be eschewed for a new one, but occasionally it 
is necessary.  Unfortunately, the opportunistic approach seems to be popular today even though 
this model seems to be doing more harm than good.  What many of the arguments for and against 
intergovernmental relations come down to is an acceptance of centralization or decentralization.  
If politicians could look back to their past and attempt to fuse the dual model with the 
cooperative model, and take the best of both worlds while disposing of the worst of each 
approach, all three levels of government, from the national level all the way down to the local, 
could begin to function much better.  Communication ssues could be solved with a better 
understanding of why the political aspect of federalism under the opportunistic approach is so 
skewed currently.  The economic and social problems of this approach would begin to be 
remedied with this fusion as well.  Until this occurs the current intergovernmental mess that the 
opportunistic approach has created will continue to linger over the entire country like a bad smell 
that just doesn’t seem to go away.   
 “Controlled Devolution” seems like the proper path for federalism to begin to travel 
down.  This would require a national intergovernmental advisement board, similar to the ACIR, 
to be reinstated.  This board would act as the overseer of state-led policy initiatives and help 
facilitate the coordination and application of these initiatives across the states.  Eventually, if 
everything went well, the board could recommend natio l policy changes.  This second order 
devolutionary process would also help quell the federal mandates and preemptions through the 
grant-in-aid programs that the states have been ecoomically effected by for the past few 
decades.  If limitations were put on these processes by a new ACIR-like board then both the 
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coordination and cooperation principles would help infuse intergovernmental policy with the 
subsidiarity principle.  
 Arguments over whether federalism should be a politica  or a constitutional question have 
swung back and forth since John Marshall was the Chi f Justice of the Supreme Court.  At times 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Tenth Amendmet in ways that forced federalism to be a 
constitutional question, like many of the rulings during the supreme era of federalism.  The 
power of the Supreme Court, since the Court gave its lf the power of judicial review in the 
Marbury v Madison decision, has grown dramatically.  Politicians and various presidential 
administrations have fought back against the encroachment of the Supreme Court's power grabs.  
Today federalism, for better or for worse, is a political question and will remain that way because 
politicians want to keep intergovernmental policy power out of the hands of the Supreme Court.  
Though I, and many others, would like to see federalism administered in a constitutional capacity 
occasionally, it is extremely difficult to remove politics from the equation.  As long as politicians 
are involved in the policy making process federalism will remain a political question; the 
opportunistic model has shown as much except for the Supreme Court's involvement in the 2000 
presidential election.   
 Cooperation and coordination are the two key components to federalism's functionality.  
Without them the country is doomed to either the ovr-encroachment of federal power to a point 
of pseudo-”tyranny” where citizens' input into intergovernmental relations has been squashed, or 
a country run fifty different ways in fifty different states with no communication between the 
governmental actors.  Neither one of these realities is pleasing, or conducive to peace and 
functional implementation of GOOD policy that actually helps people.  This warning has been 
with the country since James Madison wrote about it 226 years ago:  
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 Ambitious encroachments of the federal government, o  the authority of the State 
 governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.  
 They would be signals of general alarm...But what degree of madness could ever drive 






(Weissert, Stenberg and Cole 2009) 
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Figure 1: Sobre la muerte de la ciudad del valle germinará mi canto, Jorge Carrera Bolaños, 
 cited in Bridges: Mathematical Connections in Art, Music, and Science; Conference 
 Proceedings, 1998. Reza Sarhangi, ed., Winfield, Kansas, 1998, p. 292  
 
Figure 2: Retrieved from: http://www.civiceducationva.org/federalism6.php  
 
 
 
 
 
 
